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INTERSTATE COMPACTS ESTABLISHING STATE
ENTITLEMENTS TO WATER: AN ESSENTIAL PART
OF THE WATER PLANNING PROCESS
CHARLES T. DUMARS* & STEPHEN CURTICE**
Virtually every State in the Union is engaged in some type of water
planning effort.1 While plans vary, they generally involve an inventory of
the water available within the state boundaries and a list of the in-state
demands for use of that water. These uses can range from industrial to
agricultural, from domestic to environmental. They generally continue by
matching supply and demand, both current and future, and provide
recommendations for accommodating those elements. The plans then
address threats to water supply based on possible deterioration in water
quality, and, likewise, discuss federal complexities relating to endangered
species and federal reserved water rights, and where relevant, claims by
Native American tribes.
* Professor Emeritus, University of New Mexico Law School; partner and lead
attorney, Law & Resource Planning Associates, P.C.
** Associate, Law & Resource Planning Associates, P.C.
1. See, e.g., 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1086.1, 1086.2 (2012) (directing the Oklahoma Water
Resources Board to develop and update a comprehensive state water plan). Title 82, section
1086.1(A) provides:
All of the people have a primary interest in the orderly and coordinated control,
protection, management, conservation, development and utilization of the water
resources of the state. The people residing within areas where waters originate
benefit from the optimum development and utilization of water within the area
of origin. The people in water deficient areas benefit by being able to use
excess and surplus waters. The policy of the State of Oklahoma is to encourage
the use of surplus and excess water to the extent that the use thereof is not
required by people residing within the area where such water originates. In
order to maximize the alternatives available for the use and benefit of the
public and water-user entities and for the use and benefit of the public and for
the general welfare and future economic growth of the state, it is therefore the
purpose of this act to provide means for the expeditious and coordinated
preparation of a comprehensive state water plan and decennial updates thereof
for submission to the Legislature providing for the management, protection,
conservation, structural and nonstructural development and utilization of water
resources of this state, in accordance with [several identified] principles.
Id. § 1086.1(A). Such a state-wide plan differs from the regional approach to water planning
taken by other states, including New Mexico. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-14-43, 72-14-44
(1987). State boundaries, obviously, play a lesser role in regional water planning than in
state-wide planning, where those boundaries determine the sources of water demand and
supply.
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This article explores the importance of the most significant part of the
water planning calculus—determining the reach of the entities that can
place a demand on a state’s water resources. It asks the question: under
what possible circumstances can a state engage in “state” water planning if
the demand includes users out of state? The borders of the state define the
extent of jurisdiction over all of the key actions that generate demand for
water. That is, the legislature of one state cannot control the rate of growth
in another state, the level of water conservation in another state, or the
choices as to whether industries requiring large amounts of water should be
encouraged to move factories to the other state.
It is certainly
understandable that a planning state cannot control rainfall or climate
change. However, these uncontrolled factors can be factored into the
baseline of supply. But, if, for water planning purposes, the state border is
meaningless and the rate at which a sister state has exhausted its own water
supply, only to jump across the state line and take that of another, becomes
the determining factor, then water planning becomes a meaningless
exercise. The author argues that the drafters of the Constitution in adopting
the Commerce Clause2 anticipated that the natural competition between and
among states will require that the states arrive at negotiated accords over
the use of their shared resources. However, this thesis must be measured
against Supreme Court case law, which finds constitutionally suspect
attempts by states to isolate and hoard their natural resources.3 This article
distinguishes between these lines of cases and concludes that it was and
continues to be the law that states have a constitutional right to negotiate for
2. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution enumerates the powers of
Congress, one of which is the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
foremost problem of the federal union under the Articles of Confederation may have been its
inability to tax. The failure of the Confederation may also be attributed, however, to the
absence of national regulatory power over commerce, and to the resulting commercial
“interstate brawls.” SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 304 (1965). The records of the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist Papers,
and the histories of the period all indicate that the framers of the Constitution sought to
overcome interstate rivalries and parochial protection of local economic interests. It is this
purpose that modern Supreme Court opinions continue to describe as the original intent of
the Commerce Clause.
3. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (“Our system,
fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign state will by
customs duties or regulations exclude them.”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936).
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and receive sufficient natural resources, including water, to provide for the
support of their residents.
Part I of this article briefly describes the historical basis for the
Commerce Clause. Part II then examines some of the early mechanical
Commerce Clause tests. Part III reviews the evolution of the modern
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and the application of strict scrutiny in
the Commerce Clause context. Part IV summarizes the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Part V, in contrast,
summarizes the law of equitable apportionment and interstate compacts,
particularly in the natural resources context. Part VI argues that the
Dormant Commerce Clause has no further application once Congress has
approved an interstate compact. Part VII examines some of the policy
arguments in favor of apportioning natural resources by means of interstate
compacts. This article concludes that such interstate compacts are the best
way of resolving interstate apportionment issues.
I. The Historical Basis for the Commerce Clause
The Articles of Confederation failed for multiple political, cultural and
economic reasons. However, two principle problems are listed as the need
for the revision or the replacement of these Articles with our current
Constitution. One of these was the inability of the fledgling federal
government to raise revenue; the other was the cropping up of barriers to
interstate trade among the members of the Confederation.4 To address this
latter problem, the members of the convention ultimately agreed upon the
clause in the Constitution empowering the federal government to regulate
commerce among and between the states and with Indian tribes.5 While the
promulgation of the clause was an historic breakthrough, it did not go so far
as to empower the federal government to have the exclusive power to

4. ALFRED H. KELLEY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 108 (3d ed. 1963); MORISON, supra note 2, at 304.
5. “There were enough interstate brawls to cause great disquiet. The New York
assembly in 1787 assessed heavy entrance and clearance fees on all vessels coming from or
bound to New Jersey and Connecticut; New Jersey retaliated by taxing the lighthouse on
Sandy Hook £30 a month.” MORISON, supra note 2, at 304. See generally John B. Sholley,
The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556 (1936); Robert L.
Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645
(1946).
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regulate interstate commerce.6 Some suggest that such a proposal would
have broken up the convention.7 Thus, it was left to the Supreme Court to
determine when the subject matter of commerce was under the jurisdiction
of the federal government and when it was the province of the states.8
It did not take long for Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden,9 to make it
clear that the clause was to have some teeth and that state regulations
inconsistent with the federal intent of regulation would be invalid.10 Cooley
v. Board of Wardens11 served as an example of how that balance might be
struck in another direction.12
II. The Early Mechanical Commerce Clause Tests
Because of the potential for inherent conflict between federal and state
governments, the Supreme Court articulated numerous mechanical tests for
drawing the line between state and federal regulations.13 These included
6. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 308 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937); 3 id. at 478, 547-48. See generally SAUL K. PADOVER, TO SECURE THESE
BLESSINGS 215-19 (1962).
7. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 7, 11-12 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NOS.
41-42 (James Madison); 1 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION,
AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 502 (1854); MAX FARRAND,
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5-10 (1913); 1 FRANCIS NEWTON
THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 266-75 (1901); see also,
e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
8. The need to skirt that issue in order to reach consensus on the Constitution as a
whole may be the best explanation for the silence in the Commerce Clause concerning the
limitations on state power to regulate commerce.
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
10. Marshall’s use of the Commerce Clause greatly furthered the idea that though we
are a federation of states we are also a nation and gave momentum to the doctrine that state
authority must be subject to such limitations as the Court finds it necessary to apply for the
protection of the national community. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 18-19 (1964).
11. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
12. As Alfred North Whitehead remarked: “The [framers] had an uncommonly clear
grasp of the general ideas that they wanted put in here, then left the working out of the
details to later interpreters.” DIALOGUES OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD 203 (Lucien Price
ed., 1954); see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (“[E]ven
more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and
prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the
Constitution.”); F.D.G. RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 30 (1937).
13. Owing perhaps to the natural law tradition underlying the early development of the
American constitutional law, post-Gibbons Commerce Clause adjudication was marked by
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mechanical tests that attempted to distinguish between when a product had
started into the stream of commerce. For example, if the state regulation
antedated the movement of the product, then in that case, it was subject to
state regulation, but once it was in the stream of commerce it was subject to
federal regulation. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.14 was an example of
application of such a test. In Heisler, the act of extracting a resource was a
local state regulated activity, whereas, placing it into commerce and
interrupting its path through commerce was federal.15
When mechanical tests failed the Court finally abandoned them and was
left with the task of balancing the relative burden of the state regulation on
interstate commerce.16 If the burden was too great and frustrated the
purpose of the federal regulation then the state regulation would fail.17 This
case-by-case approach yielded mixed results without providing clarity of
the line between permissible and impermissible regulation of commerce.18
repeated but unsuccessful attempts to discover fundamental principles that could rationally
and fairly be applied to all state regulations affecting interstate commerce. See, e.g., Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262 (1827); see also Mayor of N.Y.C. v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102 (1837) (state requirement that masters of out-of-state vessels supply passenger lists
was not a regulation of commerce but an exercise of police power.)
14. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
15. Id. at 260-61; see also Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 528-29 (1886) (“There must be a
point of time when they [goods] cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic law and
begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation, and that
moment seems to us to be a legitimate one for this purpose, in which they commence their
final movement for transportation from the state of their origin to that of their destination.”).
16. The distinction between “national” and “local” subjects began to give way in the
late nineteenth century, just as the distinction between “regulation of commerce” and “police
power” previously had proved inadequate to resolve interstate commerce disputes. The
development of more sophisticated commercial relationships required the Court to look
beyond the subject of a state regulation to examine the effect of the regulation on the flow of
commerce. This focus on the regulation’s impact on commerce led to the development of
still another rubric for commerce clause analysis, which permitted state regulations to
burden commerce “only indirectly, incidentally, and remotely.” Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S.
465, 482 (1888). State regulations deemed so substantial as to constitute “direct” burdens on
interstate commerce were struck down. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Blackwell,
224 U.S. 310 (1917); Smith, 124 U.S. 465.
17. In Wabash, Saint Louis & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 572 (1886),
the Court struck down state regulation of railroad rates for interstate goods, even though
there was no conflicting federal law. Fearing that the burden of such rates enacted by
several states would be too disruptive of commerce (not unlike the state trade barriers of the
Confederation), the Court decided that the area required national “uniformity of regulation.”
Id. at 574 (quoting Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 280 (1875)).
18. The modern Court will occasionally slip behind the comfortable obfuscation of one
of these mechanical tests to reach a desired result. The debate between the majority and the
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III. The Creation of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine and Strict
Scrutiny
If matters were not complicated enough when there was a clash between
a federal regulatory statute regulating interstate commerce and a state
statute operating in the same field, they became even more difficult when
the Court concluded it had a duty to preempt state regulation of commerce
even if Congress had not acted to do so. In effect, the Court reasoned that
the mere adoption of the Commerce Clause, and authorization of
congressional legislation pursuant to that clause, instructed the Court (by
the “great silences” in that clause) to invalidate state laws that it concluded
impeded interstate commerce.19 The invalidation of state laws even though
Congress has not acted is called the exercise of the “dormant commerce
clause” doctrine. Some members of the current Court point out that in the
same way as during the era of substantive due process invalidation of state
laws, the high Court was substituting its judgment as to proper policy
conduct by states for the judgment of the states.20 Likewise, invalidation
dissenting justice in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), is
illustrative. In upholding a Maryland law that required oil producers and refiners to divest
themselves of retail operations in the state, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
reasoned:
But this Court has only rarely held that the Commerce Clause itself pre-empts
an entire field from state regulation, and then only when a lack of national
uniformity would impede the flow of interstate goods. The evil that appellants
perceive in this litigation is not that the several States will enact differing
regulations, but rather that they will all conclude that divestiture provisions are
warranted. The problem thus is not one of national uniformity. In the absence
of a relevant congressional declaration of policy, or a showing of a specific
discrimination against, or burdening of, interstate commerce, we cannot
conclude that the States are without power to regulate in this area.
Id. at 128-29 (citations omitted).
19. “[E]ven more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the
solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of
the Constitution.” H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
20. A good example is United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007). In his concurring opinion in that case, Justice
Scalia writes:
separately to reaffirm [his] view that “the so-called ‘negative’ Commerce
Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded beyond its
existing domain. . . . The historical record provides no grounds for reading the
Commerce Clause to be other than what it says—an authorization for Congress
to regulate commerce.”
Id. at 348 (internal citations omitted). Due to this belief, or perhaps in spite of it, Justice
Scalia has “been willing to enforce on stare decisis grounds a ‘negative’ self-executing
Commerce Clause in two situations: ‘(1) against a state law that facially discriminates
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under the dormant commerce clause has also been described as comparable
to the application of the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate state
economic choices as in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.21 Of course,
substantive due process invalidation of state laws was abandoned and the
test for invalidating economic measures under the Equal Protection Clause
has been articulated to result in invalidation only in the most extreme of
circumstances.
However, to avoid the argument that state regulation of commerce was
mere evaluation of state choices regarding economic prerogatives and thus
entitled to deference, the Court elevated the significance of the dormant
commerce clause by requiring state laws that discriminate against
commerce to be measured, not by traditional tests for evaluation of state
economic legislation, but rather by a standard subjecting them to strict
scrutiny somewhat comparable to the now innumerable equal protection
tests for levels of scrutiny by category. The modern commerce clause
balancing test is most clearly articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.22
There, the Court stated:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature
of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.23
against interstate commerce, and (2) against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type
of law previously held unconstitutional by the Court.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Likewise, in his concurring opinion in United Haulers Ass’n, Justice Thomas writes:
Although I joined C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, I no longer believe it
was correctly decided. The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the
Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice. As the debate between the
majority and dissent shows, application of the negative Commerce Clause turns
solely on policy considerations, not on the Constitution. Because this Court has
no policy role in regulating interstate commerce, I would discard the Court’s
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted).
21. 220 U.S. 61, 64 (1911).
22. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
23. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). Pike invalidated a state statute that required Arizona
cantaloupes to be packed in the state. The Court suggested, however, that state regulations
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In Pike, the Court attempted to adopt a balancing test that would measure
the impact of commerce of the state statute against the local putative
benefits but made it clear that if the effect was economic protectionism for
the regulating state, then the State had the burden of showing that the
method was carried out in the manner that was the least restrictive means of
achieving the goal.
With respect to economically protectionist statutes regarding natural
resources, the Court no longer engages in the fiction of weighing the
relative benefits to the state against the impacts to commerce; rather, any
intent to maintain a resource for the state and keep it out of the market is
considered per se unreasonable.24 The party attacking the statute merely
has the burden of showing there was an impact on interstate commerce and
protectionist intent. Once this showing has been made, the statute is
presumed to be invalid.25 An example of the presumptive invalidity test is
found in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,26 where the Court
invalidated a statute precluding a Nebraska native from exporting a small
portion of his groundwater to a part of his field in another state. The Court
made no attempt to weigh the impact of commerce on irrigating one’s own
field in another state. Key to the Sporhase case’s application of the per se
invalidity test were specific findings of the Court. First, the Court found
that the case did not involve an interstate compact where Congress had
apportioned water from an interstate stream to Nebraska.27 Second,
affecting public health or safety might be subjected to a lesser standard of scrutiny. Id. at
143-44.
24. In an early resource isolation case, West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229
(1911), the Court was confronted with an Oklahoma statute that in effect prohibited the
shipment of natural gas outside the state. The Court struck down the statute as purposeful
discrimination against interstate commerce. The modern cases, of course, specifically
recognize “the States’ interests in conservation . . . as legitimate local purposes similar to the
States’ interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens.” Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629
(1978) (invalidating a New Jersey law that sought to protect that state’s diminishing sanitary
landfills by banning the importation of garbage).
25. In Hughes, an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the interstate sale of Oklahoma
minnows was challenged on commerce clause grounds. 441 U.S. at 323. Hughes expressly
overruled Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), which held that because the state
“owned” the wild game within its borders the state’s control over the game was outside the
scope of the commerce clause. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 325-27. By overruling Geer, Hughes
removed the only barrier to commerce clause scrutiny of the Oklahoma statute.
26. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
27. For example, when rejecting Nebraska’s argument that groundwater was not an
article of commerce, the Court noted: “If Congress chooses to legislate in this area under its
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Nebraska, as a state, was not the owner of the groundwater: its argument
that it owned the water as a proprietor was a fiction, inconsistent with
Nebraska’s own state law.28 Finally, Congress had not specifically
addressed the groundwater in issue in any other legislation.29
The finding that the state was not the owner of the groundwater was
central to the holding that the state was regulating a commodity in interstate
commerce, namely water.30 Sporhase is a prime example of the line of
cases loosely referred to as the “resource isolation cases.”31 As with all
constitutional doctrines based upon inflexible presumptions, the principle
setting up the Court as marketplace policeman and striking down all
protectionist restrictions soon began to fray around the edges.
IV. State Market Participation as an Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause
Eventually, the Court was asked about the circumstance where the action
taken by a state was not a regulation of the movement of a private
commodity in commerce, by an allegedly protectionist state, but rather was
commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than in Texas and
States with similar property laws.” Id. at 953 (emphasis added). Further, when discussing
the role of federal deference to state water laws and interstate water compacts in general, the
Court distinguished them from questions relating to groundwater: “The interstate compacts
to which appellee refers are agreements among States regarding rights to surface water.” Id.
at 959 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 951-52.
29. Id. at 953-54.
30. Id.
31. See Michael B. Browde & Charles T. DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource
Extraction and the Commerce Clause: Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 OR. L. REV. 7, 3133 (1981). The case law characterizes the rights of states to protect their natural resources
from use in other states, as attempts to wrongfully “embargo” natural resources, Sporhase v.
Nebraska, however, the Court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609
(1981) framed the issue more correctly to be whether the Commerce Clause allows one state
to challenge the choice of another as to how and on what terms its resources should be
placed into the interstate market. Rather than an embargo, a state may choose to isolate its
resources for future generations or to allow the resources to enter the interstate market, but
with a very high resource tax. “Rather, appellants assume that the Commerce Clause gives
residents of one State a right of access at “reasonable” prices to resources located in another
state that is richly endowed with such resources, without regard to whether and on what
terms residents of the resource—rich State have access to the resources. We are not
convinced that the Commerce Clause, of its own force, gives the residents of one State the
right to control in this fashion the terms of resource development and depletion in a sister
State.” Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 618 (emphasis added).
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an exercise of economic choice by the State itself. Surely no one would
argue that because money is a commodity in commerce, a State cannot
prefer its own banks in deciding where to place its deposits obtained by
taxing its citizens. Likewise, a state can surely choose to limit its
retirement payments to state employees of its own state; it is not obligated
to offer benefits to employees who worked an equal amount of time for a
sister state government. States can prefer local contractors on state projects
when spending taxpayers’ money. If these principles are correct, could a
state that built a cement plant using taxpayers’ money choose to offer
cement in times of shortage only to state residents? The answer of the
Court was yes.32 In building the plant and in investing taxpayers’ money to
do so, the state became a participant in the market with state capital. The
dormant commerce clause did not contemplate extending its free market
principles into the pocket of the taxpayer of one state and making her pay to
subsidize construction in another state.33 The same was true of a state’s
choice in paying a bounty on junk cars brought in for demolition as a
measure of cleaning up the countryside in one state.34 The state paying the
bounty was not obligated to pay bounties for cars brought in from other
states.35
The reach of the commerce clause into state government choices also
arose in National League of Cities v. Usury,36 where the Supreme Court
raised, at least temporarily, the principle that when state legislation under
the commerce power extends into the operation of state governmental

32. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446 (1980).
33. Id. at 437.
34. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
35. The best discussion of the market participant doctrine is contained in Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause,
88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 396-98 (1989). It should be compared with William L. Kovacs &
Anthony A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services–Fair
Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENVTL. L. 779, 780-87 (1988).
Another author has also explored this question thoroughly and thoughtfully. See David
Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Post
Industrial Natural Responses, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1309-13
(1989). Government ownership has been recognized as market participation not subject to
commerce clause limitations. See Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming Cnty., 678 F. Supp.
1116, 1119-20 (M.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 883 F.2d 245 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1127 (1990). For a more recent Court pronouncement on the market participant doctrine,
see United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550
U.S. 330, 345 (2007).
36. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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functions, then the Tenth Amendment becomes a bar.37 The Court did not
explain the scope of those functions, but at a minimum, those functions
were free from interference with labor costs of municipalities by federal
legislation. While the doctrinal Tenth Amendment principle in Usury was
short lived,38 no one doubted that, on whatever doctrinal basis, there are
limits to federal intervention with state government.39 If the state’s ability
to function as a state and protect its citizens is at issue, at least up to now,
for example, there has been no attempt to argue that states are precluded
from levying state taxes to support their own governments because this has
an effect on federal power to tax.
A further difficulty raised by the dormant commerce clause became
apparent in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.40 There, Montana had
levied a 30% severance tax on coal. The tax was even handed but the effect

37. Id. at 842.
38. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (“Our
examination of this ‘function’ standard applied in these and other cases over the last eight
years now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity
in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only unworkable but is also
inconsistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism
principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is
overruled.”).
39. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978) (“The history of the
relationship between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of the arid
lands of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consistent
thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress.”). In
Sporhase, the dormant commerce clause limited state regulation of un-compacted
groundwater. More recently, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 15, 173 (2001) and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
750 (2006), have limited federal regulation of water under the affirmative commerce clause.
The irony—and the potential regulatory vacuum—of these two holdings has been noted in
Christine A. Kline, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water Export: Toward a New
Analytical Paradigm, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 131 (2011). In other areas, the Court has
limited the power of the federal government over states. See, e.g., Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding with respect to portions of the Brady Gun Control Act
requiring state officers to administer background checks that the “Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that
“while Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to
provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders, the
Constitution does not confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to do
so”).
40. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
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was to shift the burden of the tax onto out-of-state consumers.41 Those who
opposed the tax argued that plainly there could not be a more blatant
example of resource isolationism.42 The argument ran that the dormant
commerce clause makes all forms of economic protectionism per se
invalid.43 In adopting this rule, the Court precluded each state from
situating itself as a monopolist holding a needed commodity away from
sister states.44 The 30% tax had as its sole basis the desire of the State of
Montana to create a severance tax permanent fund that would be funded by
revenues borne by other states.
The Supreme Court rejected the major premise that the dormant
commerce clause had made the Court into a titular-antitrust regulatory
board that would determine whether Montana held an inordinate market
share of the nation’s share of coal resources.45 The Court considered itself
unqualified to sit in this role and rule on these factual allegations, stating:
The threshold questions whether a state enjoys a “monopoly”
position and whether the tax burden is shifted out of state, rather
than borne by in-state producers and consumers, would require
complex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of
demand for the product and alternate sources of supply. . . . It
has been suggested that “the formidable evidentiary difficulties
in appraising the geographical distribution of industry, with a
view toward determining a state’s monopolistic position might
make the Court’s inquiry futile.46
...
But even apart from the difficulty of the judicial undertaking,
the nature of the factfinding and judgment that would be
required of the courts merely reinforces the conclusion that
questions about the appropriate level of state taxes must be
resolved through the political process. Under our federal system,
41. Id. at 617-18.
42. Id.at 617-18.
43. Id. at 615.
44. Id. at 619.
45. Id. at 619 n.8.
46. Id. The Court stated further: “it is doubtful whether any legal test could adequately
reflect the numerous and competing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and
political considerations that must inform a decision about an acceptable rate or level of state
taxation, and yet be reasonably capable of application in a wide variety of individual cases.”
Id. at 628.
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the determination is to be made by state legislatures in the first
instance and, if necessary, by Congress, when particular state
taxes are thought to be contrary to federal interests.47
In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,48 the Court refused to balance
Maryland’s interest in its environment, reflected in its in-state preferential
purchasing policy, against the interests of a free interstate market:
“Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State,
in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”49 The Court
reached the same result in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake50 when it refused to balance
South Dakota’s in-state preference for cement purchasers against the
dormant commerce clause interest in a free market:
[T]he competing considerations in cases involving state
proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically
charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce
Clause analysis. Given these factors, Alexandria Scrap wisely
recognizes that, as a rule, the adjustment of interests in this
context is a task better suited for Congress than this Court.51
More important than that, the Court observed that if there were an
inherent evil in the state of Montana seeking to tax coal within its
boundaries, it was up to Congress to determine the correctness of the
principle and if necessary set the rate.52 There can be no doubt that
Montana may constitutionally raise general revenue by imposing a
severance tax on coal mined in the state. The entire value of the coal,
before transportation, originating in the state, and mining of the coal
depletes the resource base and wealth of the state, thereby diminishing a
future source of taxes and economic activity. The proposition that state
action as a market participant should only be invalidated by the Congress
and not the Court was also articulated by Justice Blackman in commenting
on the state program for setting bounties on junk cars in Alexandria Scrap.53
The wisdom of the Court in Commonwealth Edison, Reeves and
Alexandria Scrap that one should look to Congress when evaluating state
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Id. at 810 (emphasis added).
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 439.
Id.
See id. at 434-36.
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choices about its own resources does not stand in isolation. Rather, it is
supported by over one hundred years of Supreme Court case law upholding
apportionment of surface water among states so that each state receiving a
share of the apportioned water could plan for its water future.
V. Equitable Apportionment and Interstate Compacts: Judicial and
Congressional Authorization of State Economic Protectionism
As population grew within competing states, it was only a matter of time
before states sharing a common river found themselves in conflict with the
upstream state asserting absolute ownership of water originating within its
borders and the downstream state arguing that the resource must be
shared.54 Because, as the Court observed, war between the states was not
an option, the Supreme Court asserted original jurisdiction to resolve these
interstate disputes.55 The result of the dispute was a decree from the Court
apportioning an amount to each state for its use in perpetuity. The criteria
for apportionment is not fixed, but includes, as described in Nebraska v.
Wyoming,56 the needs of the two states, present and future, the conservation
practices within each state, and the degree to which states have built up a
dependence on the water resource through prior use.57 However, whatever
the criteria, the decree made each state secure in its entitlement to the
quantity of water apportioned to it. Subsequent changes in demand could
not alter that apportionment.
Because of the myriad difficulties in resolution of these original
jurisdiction cases, consuming time and requiring factual trials, the Court
encourages the states to attempt to negotiate interstate compacts that could
54. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). There, the Court construed the
issue to be whether Colorado “has it an absolute right to determine for itself the extent to
which it will diminish [the flow of the interstate river], even to the entire appropriation of the
water” Id. at 85. The Court answered in the negative:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each other, is that
of equality of right. Each State stands on the same level with all the rest. It can
impose its own legislation on no one of the others, and is bound to yield its own
views to none.
Id. at 97.
55. Id. at 98 (“Surely here is a dispute of a justiciable nature which must and ought to be
tried and determined. If the two States were absolutely independent nations it would be
settled by treaty or by force. Neither of these ways being practicable, it must be settled by
decision of this court.”).
56. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
57. Id. at 618; see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982); Wyoming
v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 467-70 (1922).
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be ratified by Congress.58 Once ratified, such compacts become: a) federal
law; and b) binding contracts between the states.59 Each state thus binds
itself to a fixed apportionment of the water from the stream, not only by
federal law, but also by contract.
These interstate water compacts, then, are the manifestation of the
exercise of Congress of its power under the Commerce Clause and under
the Compact Clause to regulate commerce. These compacts are not vague
indirect regulations of commerce set by an agency such as water quality
standards for streams or standards for interstate trucks nor are they indirect
deferrals to states to regulate specific businesses. Instead, these compacts
are specific directives from Congress that each compacting state shall
receive a certain quantity of water and no more.
Compacts are federal law, and “congressional consent transforms an
interstate compact within [the Compact Clause of the federal constitution]
into a law of the United States” such that the construction of such an
agreement “presents a federal question.”60 As the Court has noted,
The requirement of congressional consent is at the heart of the
Compact Clause. By vesting in Congress the power to grant or
withhold consent, or to condition consent on the States’
compliance with specified conditions, the Framers sought to
ensure that Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power
over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere with
the full and free exercise of federal authority.61
The “full and free exercise of federal authority” is particularly relevant to
interstate compacts apportioning water among the states. Since at least
1891, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has plenary
58. For example, in Washington v. Oregon, 214 U.S. 205, 218 (1909), a case involving
an interstate boundary dispute, the Court concluded the opinion by noting congressional
approval of other boundary compacts and stated:
We submit to the States of Washington and Oregon whether it will not be wise
for them to pursue the same course, and, with the consent of Congress, through
the aid of commissioners, adjust, as far as possible, the present appropriate
boundaries between the two States and their respective jurisdiction.
Id.; see also West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 26-27 (1951); Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 105 (1938); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
59. Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 245 (1991) (citing Texas v. New Mexico,
482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)).
60. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981); see also NYSA-ILA Vacation &
Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm’n, 732 F.2d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 1984).
61. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 439-40.
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authority to enact legislation that authorizes the states to burden interstate
commerce in a way that would otherwise violate the dormant commerce
clause.62 The cases following this basic rule are legion.63
The import of these cases to interstate water disputes is obvious: where
Congress has affirmatively apportioned water to a compacting state, the
dormant commerce clause is simply inapplicable.64 In virtually all cases,
the express purposes of the compact are to: a) resolve all future disputes as
to ownership of the apportioned water; b) apportion a quantity of water to
the respective states; and c) make it clear that one state cannot take water
apportioned to the other without permission. In other words, they are
unapologetically economically protectionist. To this end, when one state
breaches the contract and attempts to take the waters of another in violation
of the compact, the state is liable in damages and sovereign immunity is
waived.65
In this regard, the case of Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River
Compact Commission66 is particularly instructive. There, the plaintiffs
argued that the dormant commerce clause holding in Sporhase invalidated a
Yellowstone River Compact provision that required unanimous approval by
the signatory states for any out-of-basin transfer.67 The district court
observed that while a consent requirement on the out-of-state transfer of
62. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 561 (1891).
63. See, e.g., Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 174 (1985); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648,
652-53 (1981) (citing Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 44 (1980));
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1981); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 438 (1936); James Clark Distilling Co. v. W.
Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 330 (1917); Sw. Air Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 268
F.3d 1162, 1177 (10th Cir. 2001).
64. People ex rel. Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 917 P.2d 1242, 1249 n.8 (Colo.
1996) (“The congressional approval feature of a[n interstate water] compact is particularly
important, in that Congress can assent to state laws which might otherwise be invalid as an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.”); cf. N.Y. State Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Ne.
Dairy Compact Comm’n, 198 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that congressional approval
of an interstate compact creating a commission whose authority included regulating milk
prices precluded a dormant Commerce Clause challenge to that regulation: “The relevant
initial question, then, is not whether the Compact violates the Commerce Clause. Instead,
the starting point of the inquiry is whether Congress consented to the actions of the
Commission.”).
65. See infra note 75.
66. 590 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mont. 1983), aff’d 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985).
67. Id. at 296; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-23-01 art. X.
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water might ordinarily have run afoul of Sporhase, that case could not
apply where Congress had approved the interstate compact containing that
requirement.68 That is, the claim that a court could overturn a federal
compact apportioning water under the dormant commerce clause was an
oxymoron: “Here, Congress’s approval of the Yellowstone River Compact
in 1951 may be considered the express statement of intent to immunize the
Compact from attack that the Court found lacking in Sporhase.”69 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed this holding with little
comment: “When Congress approved this compact, Congress was acting
within its authority to immunize state law from some constitutional
objections by converting it into federal law.”70
Every case apportioning water among states does so in order to finally
determine the quantity of water that can be maintained by each state for
future use.71 Every case interpreting interstate compacts has done so as to
clarify the quantity of water apportioned to each compacting state and to
determine whether another state has illegally attempted to take water
apportioned to another state.72 The Supreme Court has enforced compacts’
water allocations to states’ exclusive use and regulation to the point of
ordering that money damages be paid to compensate a state for short
deliveries.73

68. Id. at 297.
69. Id. at 297; see also id. (“Thus, when it approves a[n interstate water] compact,
Congress exercises the legislative power that the compact threatens to encroach upon, and
declares that the compact is consistent with Congress's supreme power in that area.”).
70. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568, 570 (9th
Cir. 1985); cf. Eder v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788, 795 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (finding that the enactment of federal legislation declaring that regulation of the taking
of fish and wildlife within a state’s boundaries should be left to the state “‘moots’ plaintiffs’
dormant Commerce Clause claim”).
71. See e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (Vermejo River), appeal
after remand, 467 U.S. 310 (1984); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), decree
modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953), settlement entered, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40
(2001) (North Platte River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922), decree modified,
260 U.S. 1 (1922), new decree entered, 353 U.S. 953 (1957) (Laramie River); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99-100 (1907) (Arkansas River).
72. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (Yellowstone River);
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995) (Arkansas River); Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501
U.S. 221 (1991) (Canadian River); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938).
73. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 7 (2001) (Arkansas River Compact of
1949); Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128-33 (1987) (Pecos River Compact).
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The literature discussing the importance of interstate compacts has
concluded that the primary purpose—indeed the sole purpose—of an
interstate water compact is to allow each state to know how much water of
an interstate stream is allocated to it.74 Professor Trelease’s view is typical:
Economic protection is the very purpose of the compact. The
split of unappropriated water is intended to free the states from
the need to race for the water under the usually applied (though
recently questioned) rule of Wyoming v. Colorado: “priority is
equity” between two states that apply the law of prior
appropriation internally, and the same law will fix their shares in
an equitable apportionment. A compact halts the race. Each
state is given a fund of water free from the priorities of the other,
each can develop at its own pace, and the slower state is
protected from a complete takeover of the joint resource by the
faster. To allow the faster state to overreach its allotment and eat
into the other’s in the name of interstate commerce would drain
of all force the “legal expectation” given by the compact.75
But how can the equitable apportionment cases and the cases upholding
economically protectionist compacts ratified by Congress be squared with
the cases finding state economic protectionism over groundwater resources,
as in Sporhase, to be essentially per se invalid?
VI. The Dormant Commerce Clause Cases Have No Application Once
Congress Has Approved an Interstate Compact
Once Congress has determined, as a vital part of our federal/state
partnership, that each state be apportioned some portion of the waters
originating in it or passing through it to ensure its viability as a state, the
dormant commerce clause is irrelevant. Even though state ownership of
water may be a fiction in the absence of an interstate compact or an
equitable apportionment decree, or a purchase or appropriation of water by
a state, qua state, once the water is apportioned to a state by a compact or
equitable apportionment decree, the state serves as the owner of the water
74. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 718 (1925); Julius M. Friedrich, The
Settlement of Disputes between States Concerning Rights to the Waters of Interstate
Streams, 32 IOWA L. REV. 244, 278 (1947); J. David Prince, State Control of Great Lakes
Water Diversion, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 107, 158 (1990).
75. Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56
U. COLO. L. REV. 347, 349 (1985).
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in trust for the users within the boundaries. Making the state the owner of
the resource in trust for its resident users is the only purpose of the
equitable apportionment decree or interstate compact. Once enshrined by
Congress into federal law, it is final.
Congress can preclude the application of the dormant commerce clause
indirectly by authorizing the states to forge their own discriminatory
regulation or it can do so directly by mandating that states take certain
actions with respect to movement of goods in commerce. In the latter case,
once Congress has acted, it is of no importance whether such state action
might have been prohibited in absence of the congressional mandate. An
example of the indirect approach is explored in Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin.76 The McCarran Act at issue in that case provided:
The Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress
shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.77
The best example of a direct congressionally-mandated approach is the
congressionally-approved interstate compact. The Red River Compact, for
example, expressly allocates water to Oklahoma that is not available in
commerce to Texas and allocates water to Texas that is not available in
commerce to Oklahoma.
Litigation arises when Congress has not legislated directly on the issue,
and states attempt to argue solely by inference that Congress displaced the
dormant commerce clause. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas78 and
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke79 both represent
failed attempts by States to make such an inferential leap. In each case,
Congress had not legislated on the specific subject at issue. Unlike
Prudential Ins. Co., there was no federal disclaimer of interest that
purported to authorize the challenged state regulation of the relevant
segment of commerce. There was no federal adoption of a compact
allocating the resources at issue. In the absence of express legislation, the
defenders of the discriminatory state laws were forced to infer that
Congress would have authorized the challenged state regulation.

76.
77.
78.
79.

328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946).
Id. at 429 (quoting the McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945)).
458 U.S. 941 (1982).
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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In Wunnicke, the party looked to federal regulations and policy
governing timber resources on federal lands to support an inference of
consent to Alaska’s similar regulation of timber on state lands.80 In
Sporhase, the state looked to the Reclamation Act, the Desert Lands Act,
and to interstate water compacts in general to support an inference that
Congress would have deferred to state regulation of the groundwater at
issue, which was not covered by a compact.81 In both cases, the issue was
what Congress would do if it chose to act in the future, not what Congress
had done when it enacted specific legislation such as an interstate compact.
Because there was no federal law directly addressing the matter subject to
state discrimination, the Court required that the evidence be “expressly
stated”82 or “unmistakably clear”83 before it would infer the intent of
Congress from somewhat related laws. Neither Sporhase nor Wunnicke
held or even suggested that a congressionally-approved interstate water
compact itself, the essential provisions of which apportion water and affirm
State regulation thereof, must meet a talismanic “unmistakably clear”
requirement in order for the State regulation to escape invalidation. Rather,
because Congress has acted, the test articulated in McCulloch v.
Maryland,84 which remains viable to this day, forms the basis for review.
Sporhase and Wunnicke simply do not apply to this question, because
neither interpreted an express mandate regulating interstate commerce.
A comparison of the circumstances of the groundwater prohibited from
export in Sporhase85 with an interstate stream apportioned by Congress
provides the best example. In Sporhase, Congress had not acted to
apportion the groundwater. Nebraska had not taken action to assert
ownership of the groundwater for a state purpose. The express purpose of
the statute was to isolate Nebraska’s water from interstate commerce. In
this circumstance, in the absence of an apportionment by Congress,
Nebraska was obligated to demonstrate some rationale for the statute
embargoing the water, which it could not do. The Court made the explicit
point that interstate compacts and state boundaries are relevant and reflect a
80. Id. at 88-89.
81. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 958-59.
82. Id. at 960.
83. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 82.
84. 17 U.S 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate . . . .”).
85. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956 (noting that the “legal expectation” that States may
restrict water within their borders has been advanced “by the negotiation and enforcement of
interstate compacts. Our law therefore has recognized the relevance of state boundaries in
the allocation of scarce water resources”).
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different circumstance where different rules would apply. Finally, even
though Nebraska was able to cite to some federal policies that would
respect state regulation of groundwater, none explicitly authorized the
embargo. The proposed place of use for the water was Colorado. Nebraska
and Colorado had not negotiated a compact in good faith which had as its
purpose allowing Nebraska to keep the groundwater that was sought to be
exported. And, Congress had not expressly acted under the authority of the
commerce clause to allow Nebraska to keep the groundwater. Thus, none
of the policies urging states to negotiate their water differences and pressing
for the finality of compacts existed, because there was no compact.
VII. The Policies Supporting a Free Interstate Market in Natural Resources
Are Outweighed by the Policies Supporting the Finality of Interstate
Compacts and the Need to Allow Each State to Plan for Its Water Future
While the dormant commerce clause policies continue to hold sway with
the Court, as arbiter of the interstate marketplace, none of those policies
apply—and indeed are specifically negated—when the states have been
granted authority by Congress to enter into an interstate compact. The
Compacts are presumed to apportion water among the states because this is
their express purpose. There are substantial policy reasons for interpreting
compacts as involving final apportionments. And, there is no inherently
flawed anima for either state in seeking, in a sense as a market participant,
to prefer its own citizens in using the very water that the state was able to
negotiate for them in arriving at the compact.
It is of course inevitable that some states will be unsatisfied with the
quantities they were able to obtain in negotiating under the compact. When
this happens, hydrologic arguments over delivery amounts or
interpretations over specific provisions inevitably break out, such as in
Texas v. New Mexico.86 However, it is rare that any state has the temerity
to argue that the purpose of the compact was to do anything other than to
apportion the water. In short, once Congress acted to apportion the water,
the commerce clause is no longer dormant—its purpose has been made
manifest and Congress concluded that it did not violate any principles of
free interstate resource markets to apportion the waters in perpetuity among
the states.
In a recent case, the Tarrant Regional Water District attempted to argue
that the principles of Sporhase label as constitutionally suspect any state
economic protectionist statute and, furthermore, should apply with equal
86. 482 U.S. 124 (1987).
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force even in the face of federal legislation apportioning water by interstate
compact.87 Of course, the principal problem with this argument is that
while states may be precluded by the dormant commerce clause from
apportioning groundwater to themselves, Congress is not subject to such a
constraint if it chooses to apportion water to a state or among states. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit so held in Tarrant Regional Water
Dist. v. Herrmann, in an opinion issued on September 7, 2011.88 The Court
addressed the difference between the instant mater and the Intake Water
case: “This case does not include a challenge to the [Red River] Compact,
but the Compact is the focus of our analysis. We must examine the
relationship between the Compact and the Oklahoma water statutes to
decide whether Congress has displaced the restrictions of the dormant
Commerce Clause.”89 At the same time, the Court distinguished Sporhase:
Sporhase is distinguishable because in that case Nebraska was
attempting to regulate the interstate transfer of groundwater that
was not subject to an interstate compact. In this case, the water
is subject to the Red River Compact, and the issue is whether the
Compact insulates Oklahoma’s statutes from dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.90
After an exhaustive examination of the text of the Red River Compact,
the Court concluded that it “gives Oklahoma wide berth to protect its
compacted water against out-of-state transfer and use.”91
Congress has apportioned water in the Boulder Canyon Project for the
lower Colorado and has ratified innumerable interstate compacts achieving
the same result. Indeed, conferring the power to regulate commerce was the
very function anticipated in adoption of the Commerce Clause. While those
who attempt to use Sporhase as a sword to invalidate congressional
apportionment may themselves believe that state control over a fixed
amount of water is so inherently evil that the Court should sift and weigh
the relative monopolistic pressures exerted by states, and invalidate
apportionments under interstate compacts, this is not the view of the
87. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 656 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 1251. At around the same time, the Tenth Circuit determined that the Cities of
Hugo, Oklahoma and Irving, Texas lacked standing to challenge the Oklahoma statutes
under the political subdivision standing doctrine. City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251,
1257-58, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2011).
89. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist., 656 F.3d at 1236.
90. Id. at 1237 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 1239.
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Supreme Court. Commonwealth Edison made this point clear. To the
contrary, the Court has expressly left this function to Congress, recognizing
it contains neither the will nor the judicial authority to make such
judgments.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court is correct in urging Congress to ratify
apportionments of water to states. Water serves vital and multiple purposes
directly tied to state sovereignty. Its momentum value generates muchneeded hydropower; its buoyancy value floats barges; it is a universal
solvent essential to all forms of manufacturing including computer chips;
and it is essential for agriculture and for domestic consumption of cities.
The Supreme Court has determined that each state has a right to some share
of this resource and the best method for determining that share is the
interstate compact. The interstate compact gives meaning to the boundaries
of each sharing the water resource. It permits each state to define the
supply based on its own projected rate of growth. It allows the states to
take actions against those who might waste the resource, and it provides
accountability for state officials who dispose of it in a way inconsistent with
the will of the people within the state boundaries. Whether the per se rule
of the invalidity of state attempts to capture some quantity of water for their
exclusive use in the absence of congressional action is a good one, this
Supreme Court imposed presumption should never be used to invalidate
interstate compacts and preclude water planning by states based upon the
amount of water apportioned to them by Congress.
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